to which he objected. Like almost every other sixteenth-century writer on art, Molanus took up and expanded the Council's condemnation of lascivious and indecent imagery, but as he was pnmanly concerned with these problems m relation to religious art, a few words should be said about attitudes in the Netherlands towards indecency in the representation of profane subjects. Nudity, needless to say, was the main concern,''' and thus we find a whole vanety of writers, from the poetess Anna Bijns to the theologian Martin Donk, phrasing their objections in a way which also served -they thought -to undermine the Protestant stance on images. Why, they asked, did iconoclasts do away with images of Christ and the saints instead of strange histories and pagan narratives? They destroyed what inspired devotion but not what roused unchastity. In their own homes they had unedifying and immoral representations of Lucretia, Venus, and other female goddesses.'* The kind of picture we can imagine such writers were referring to may be represented by Jan Massys's evidently popular portrayals of female nudes (plates 2 and 3);'' works hke these reached the height of fashion m the half-dozen years immediately preceding lconoclasm.^" But for Molanus the depiction of a holy subject in an unedifying way was still worse. Not only did he go so far as to proscribe the representation of the naked Christ Child (lest children, above all, be corrupted) (plate 4),^' he also felt that it was unnecessary to show David luring Bathsheba into Adultery, the Dance of Salome, or even the Magdalen unchastely represented in her pre-conversion state as a woman of the world, instead of as a penitent (plates 5 and 6).^^ Here, of course, one has also to do with the notion of decorum, and one moves away from the field of expressly lascivious imagery -though most of these images were certainly that too. Molanus went to some length to ensure that sacred subjects were not represented in an indecorous manner. Like Erasmus he objected to the representation of St Peter red-faced from the effects of too much drink in paintings of Chnst in the House of Martha and Mary,^^ such as those which were produced on several occasions by Pieter Aertsen and Joachim Beuckelaer, in Molanus's lifetime (plate 7; cf. plate 8).^^ Details such as this were proscnbed not merely because they were indecorous, but for another reason: there was no reference to them m the Bible. Although it is often claimed that the Council of Trent expressly forbade all subjects of an apocryphal or non-canonical nature, the only specific objections are to images of 'false dogma,' and to those regarded as 'contrary to custom ' or 'unwonted' (insohtae) .^^ But vwiters hke Molanus -and Paleotti later on -were to expand this concern into a wide-ranging and cntical review of all subjects for which there was no firm canonical or histoncal basis. The detailed enumeration of traditional subject-matter in both Molanus and Paleotti provides evidence of the extent and depth of their cntique; but Paleotti never got round to completing or publishing his third, fourth and fifth books (though the detailed table of contents which survives gives some idea of what he planned to include in them). Molanus's thorough investigations, on the other hand, were to be the most influential of all the post-Tridentme theological writers; and it is he who reveals most cleairly the tension between stricture and practical exigency that characterizes many of the phenomena we will be describing.
He deplored the representation of midwives at the Nativity -as had long
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been depicted in paintings hke Campin's Nativity in Dijon -on the grounds that their inclusion was based on the apocryphal bookDe Infantia Salvatons-^l ike several others before him he did not wish to have the Virgin shown dying on her sickbed because she died, just as she had given birth, without any pain;^' and he went to quite extraordinary lengths to demonstrate why it was wrong to represent the third magus as black, in paintings of the Adoration of the Magi (plate 9).^^ Finally, there was a class of imagery which was not only uncanonical, but could also be seen as a kind of threat to received dogma. Amongst such images were those which showed Chnst in the form of a homunculus descending amongst the rays to the Virgin m paintings oi the Annunciation (as in the central panel of the Merode altarpiece in New York) (plate 10),^^ and pictures of the Resurrection where the cover of the sarcophagus was removed (cf. plate 11)^" on the grounds that the miracle of the event consisted precisely in the fact that Christ had nsen from the closed tomb.^' Fifteenth-century works as well as contemporary ones have deliberately been chosen to illustrate the kinds of subjects which Molanus wished to proscribe. They testify not only to his awareness of the art around him -a rare enough phenomenon amongst the theological writers on art -but also to the strength of certain pictorial traditions. In this respect, as will become apparent, Molanus was tilting at windmills.
But there was another, more tolerant side to Molanus. Amongst the subjects to which he objected but which he thought could be tolerated were, for example, the Seven foys and Seven Sorrows ofthe Virgin (plates 12 and 13).^T hough apocryphal, such subjects were harmless and too firmly rooted m popular tradition to be easily eradicated, as Molanus himself acknowledged.^F or similar reasons he was prepared to allow representations of St Christopher carrying the Christ Child or of the Apostles surrounding the Virgin's tomb in paintings of the Assumption of the Virgin -despite the fact that they were apocryphal too.^'* Popular prints showing the wounded hands, feet and heart were also permissible, on the grounds that they inspired devotion and could be used for salutary meditation.^^ These examples are mentioned here to show that despite his apparent censonousness, Molanus was prepared to display a quite unusual degree of tolerance. Indeed, he reminded his readers that those who squeeze too tightly draw blood -Nam qui nimium emungit elicit sanguinem.^^ But at the same time these broadminded sections of his work serve to emphasize the extraordinarily careful and comprehensive nature of Molanus's cnteria for prohibition and censorship.
This listing has exemplified only a few out of the vast set of rules provided by Molanus, and those famihar with the Italian vwiters on art will recognize at least some of them, and be able to add many others. One thing, however, is clear. Hardly any of these attempted interdictions can be said to have been successful; several of the illustrations reproduced here serve as a demonstration of that. Indeed, even the official interdictions -against books, music and theatre as well as against paintings -were notoriously ineffective. In most cases established pictorial traditions and iconographic habits were simply too strong; and the fact that particular restrictions failed to apply to those who were above them -like Philip II himself -can hardly have helped to weaken the 
survival of customary forms of representation. But how is it that -contrary to what one might expect -the arguments of the Protestant writers against images often provided a direct impulse to iconoclasm,^^ while the prohibitions which Catholic theologians wished to introduce had so little effect? Admittedly attempts were made to cover up the nudities in the Sistine ChapeP^ and one finds an occasional artist like Ammanati, who expressed his remorse at having sculpted lascivious figures in his rash youth.^^ But these are exceptions rather than the rule.
Historians of art may feel that there is a relatively simple answer to the question of why so many interdictions fail to work. Artistic styles, modes and fashions cannot be made to change at the whim of a theological decision; whatever theologians may say, artists themselves are -by and large -more concerned with aesthetic matters than the intricacies of orthodox dogma. Thus, when confronted with complaints about the heretical ideas contained in Botticini's (?) Assumption now in the National Gallery in London, Vasari simply dismissed the problem by saying that 'As to whether this is true or false, I cannot be expected to judge; it is enough that the figures painted therein . . . are entirely worthy of praise ... all varied m diverse ways and the whole executed with good design';"*" while an amusing story about Toto del Nunziata betrays a wry -and sophisticated -awareness of the fact that the fault lay as much in the mind of the beholder as m the artist's intention. When a citizen once confessed to him that certain painters displeased him because they only treated lascivious subjects, and then went on to say that he wanted a Madonna which should be modest and not an incitement to desire, Nunziata painted him one with a beard.^' Artists had little choice m the matter. The fashion, or rather the mode, was to paint charming Madonnas, and there was plenty of scriptural authonty for her beauty. Even if one wanted to, one was hardly likely to paint stem and forbidding Virgins: they simply would not have sold very well.
But all this is begging the question. The fact is that interdictions were formulated and artists expected to submit their works to rigorous ecclesiastical supervision. Following the promulgation of the Tridentine decrees, church officials insisted on seeing preliminary designs for new altarpieces, and penodically visited artists' studios m order to ensure that their stipulations and requirements were not infringed."*^ For a long time afterwards, the Church Visitors made the rounds of the parish churches, insisting on alterations to indecorous imagery in one place, and the eradication of superfluous or aberrant imagery in another. But even this kind of control seems to have been largely ineffective.^^ Only once one has established why interdictions anse in the first place, and what their motives are, can one begin to see the fundamental reasons for their success or failure. First we should attempt to define the function of the interdictions enumerated here and then examine more closely the relationship between their intended purpose and their actual effect.
In general terms, the sixteenth-century rules were intended to counter and weaken Protestant charges against images: by removing the abuses associated with religious art, Catholic theologians hoped to eliminate those aspects which offended the critics. But the charges were more substantial than that, and 137 THE HIDDEN GOD IMAGE AND INTERDICTION IN THE NETHERLANDS required, as we shall see, a more basic defence of the validity of images. At this point It should be made clear that we are seeking the social origins of these interdictions, and attempting to define their role and function in the particular society we are considering. I have, in short, borrowed from Durkheim in replacing the ethnographer's taboo -in any case a much debated term -with the less specific term of interdiction.'*^ Interdictions are simply an embodiment of that which is forbidden -rather than that which is prescribed -in a particular social group.^^ They have two mam objects: first, to separate different classes of the sacred, and second -and more significantly -to separate the profane from the sacred. Both aspects of interdiction arise from a collective awareness and acknowledgment of the sacred.^* Let us see how this applies to the prohibitions we have been considenng.
The relative tolerance extended to paintings of subjects such as the Sorrows and Joys of the Virgin, or St Christopher, for example, represents the separation of different classes of the sacred;'*' and the fact that various attempts were made to diminish the importance of the representation of saints and to confine them to the side panels of triptychs and polyptychs is further testimony to this kind of interdiction. For the rest, however, the mterdictions -whether attempted or real -are to be seen m terms of the separation of the sacred from the profane. This applies, for example, to the rule about processions: Holy images were not to be carried about or saints' days celebrated as if they were profane feasts or heathen ceremonies.^^ There is an unspoken awareness and concern here about the fact that many of the religious festivals grew out of much older pagan rites, though it is perhaps best not to press the point too far. Sacred subjects should not be represented as profane ones. Even the concern about nudity m art may be seen in these terms. Ostensibly, nudity may have been forbidden because of the fear of carnality; but there was possibly another reason. The statues and subjects of pagan antiquity were represented as nude forms, as Clement of Alexandria knew as well as Molanus,"" and one needed to avoid all possible confusion with that, in order to ensure that the distinction between Christian sacredness and pagan profanity did not become blurred. But the profane was not only to be equated with the remains of non-Christian rites and customs. It was also necessary to maintain the distinction between the everyday and the sacred. Here lies the root of many of the interdictions to be found in the sixteenth century -including, for example, the concern about representing the Virgin suffering m childbirth or dying on her sickbed in the way ordinary women do. This is the root of the recurrent objections to painters like Caravaggio who appear to confuse the everyday with the sacred. Now all this may seem fairly obvious, and I am aware that the Durkheimian distinction between sacred and profane has been charged with being too blunt to be serviceable. We will m fact modify it later, but the nature of these interdictions has been rehearsed at some length because they all imply one thing: a recognition, however confused, of the polarity of the sacred and non-sacred. At the same time, they bear witness to the contagiousness of the sacred, to the tendency of what is regarded as sacred to be carried over into apparently non-sacred objects and to leave its traces there. This is one of the reasons for the fear, articulated by the theologians, of so wide a range of visual imagery. It is obvious that the profane may contaminate the holy, but sacred contagion is just as significant, and is more or less inevitable; both factors, as we shall see, account for the relative ineffectiveness of the interdictions we have been considering. Here we move one step closer towards an understanding of the status of the image in the sixteenth century; but first we must ask ourselves what the image itself was supposed to be, not merely the subject or Its matenal and physical form, but the image as a whole; not signified or signifier, but the sign itself. The Council of Trent's decree on images again provides a starting point.
The decree began with an assertion of the value of invoking the saints and venerating their relics; only then did it give the reasons for retaining images in churches and for honouring and worshipping them. It is the first of these reasons that must concern us here. Images were to continue to be venerated not because any divinity was beheved to inhere in them, nor because of any particular virtue for which they might be worshipped, nor indeed because one sought anything from them, or placed one's faith in them, as the heathen used to do when they placed their faith in idols. One worshipped and venerated images because the honour paid to them passed on to the subjects they represented.^" The decree then went on to restate the value of images in instructing the people and reaffirming their faith,^' in terms derived indirectly from Gregory the Great,^^ Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas;^^ but it is the passage taken out of context from St Basil, that the honour paid to an image passes to its prototype, which IS crucial.^Ô ne of the commonest forms of the Protestant criticism of images was that in venerating them one merely venerated inanimate pieces of wood and stone ;^t he official Catholic response, therefore, was. No, it is not the wood and stone that we worship, it is what the images represent. In these two opposing standpoints one finds the theological expression of one of the basic questions about the nature of images in the sixteenth century. The present task, however, is not to determine what the ritual status of images was supposed to be, but rather what It actually was. Here we are treading on difficult ground. In the first place It IS clear that the theological arguments had a specific polemical function, and cannot therefore provide a guide to the nature of men's response to images. Although the Protestant argument has some element of truth in it, it really is rather specious. However splendid the material objects were (and in this respect Martin Luther made similar criticisms to St Bernard),'* men worshipped them only because they represented something else, something holy. The Cathohc rebuttal, on the other hand, has all the air of an academic distinction: Is it likely, we may ask ourselves, that the countless men who went on pilgrimages to particular images, who sought aid from a favourite painting or sculpture, or who went to be healed by the miracle-working powers of a specific shrine made this kind of distinction? All the evidence suggests not. They expected such things not simply from St Anthony or the Virgin, but from specific physical embodiments of them, from a St Anthony in a favoured chapel, from the Virgin at a renowned pilgrimage shrine. In all ages men have tended to fuse image and prototype, to attribute the powers of the signified to the sign itself. But why IS this so, and what are the implications for the study of the art of a particular period, in our case the sixteenth century? The totem, to put it in Durkheimian terms again, is above all a symbol of something else;'^ and the sentiments something arouses in us spontaneously attach themselves to the symbol representing it. Thus it comes about that it is the image of a saint which works miracles or exercises power; not the samt himself, but the saint in or working through a particular image. This is the fusion of image and prototype just referred to, and this is why all images retain traces of the life, in the sense of the anima, of the signified. Under certain conditions, as in the countless medieval miracle legends, such as those by Caesarius von Heisterbach and Gautier de Coincy,^* images may actually come alive; men destroy images not only because they are symbols of a rejected or hated or repressive order, but because they feel that by destroying them they somehow break or diminish the power of the images concerned. Hence the mutilation of statues by the removal of their most vital parts, their arms, legs or heads;'' or the eradication of that which expresses their hfehke quahty most of all, their eyes. Here a cautionary note may be added: 1 am not say ing that by destroying or mutilating a painting or sculpture one somehow damaged the being it represented, by a magical or any other kind of process. All that is being suggested is that such actions sought to diminish the particular power of an image.
But what IS the connection between the animism of images and the interdictions with which this paper began? In his Natural History of Religion, Hume accounted for the attribution of life to inanimate objects by saying that 'there IS a universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities with which they are famiharly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious'^" -a passage which was also quoted by Freud in his discussion of animism in Totem and Taboo.^N ow all this seems self-evident, but it is precisely the tendency to transfer qualities with which men are familiar that blurs the distinction between sacred and profane, between the holy and the everyday, the numinous and the physical. We have already seen how the basis of the Catholic interdictions lay in the need to preserve this distinction, but the same need also informs one of the best-known and most emphasized of the Protestant interdictions: that of the prohibition against representing God in human form. One of the most remarkable of the many examples to be found of the kind of censorship which resulted from this prohibition is represented by the alteration of engravings after Marten de Vos, as exemplified by the transformation illustrated in plates 14 and 15.*^ It IS common enough to find paintings or engravings where the figure of God the Father has been covered over, but the alteration of the copper plate itself is more unusual, and provides a striking instance of the attempt to preserve the sacredness of the divine by stripping it of every possible human -and therefore profane -reference. The transfer of qualities with which we are familiar to an object, as described by Hume, has no possibility here. God is not objectified at all -he has been replaced by a radiant emptiness, filled not by an image but by words. The human and the physical has been supplanted by the numinous, by the obviously sacred. But in the mutilation of the tragic sheet illustrated m plate 16," one IS dealing with a somewhat different phenomenon (whether it was cut up at the end of the sixteenth century or later does not really matter). This *y^Z'^v< \ is the point at which interdiction becomes iconoclasm. The mutilation is not merely an instance of the objection to showing God the Father in human form; it IS an attempt to deprive the image of its very life. Fear of the power inherent in an image is at least one of the reasons for its destruction. All images, even apparently secular ones, retain something of the powers associated with their subjects. It is the recognition of this that leads on the one hand to the elaboration of a system of interdictions, and on the other to iconoclasm.
It has been suggested that almost every interdiction arises from the need to separate the sacred from the profane. But here one confronts a problem that is implicit in the whole discussion presented here. By what criteria may one distinguish between the sacred and the profane? The question arises not only because many of the interdictions appear to have failed precisely because of the variety and potential variability of the criteria, but also because it raises some of the basic methodological issues at stake in any study of the place of images m society. Perhaps, it will be argued, one has to define more precisely the kinds of images to which the interdictions were supposed to apply. Did they apply only to altarpieces in public places, or to all paintings with religious subjects? Did they extend to secular imagery^ Was the purely narratival less importantfrom the point of view of the interdictions -than the intentionally devotional? But these questions do not resolve themselves very easily. There are many cases from the sixteenth century where the matter seems ambiguous What is one to make, for example, of Lucas vaii Leyden' It may all seem a matter of function, and we may think that the problem of definition resolves itself once we have established the ritual function of the painting concerned, or whether it hung m a private house or in a church, in a tavern, a tovm hall, or a chapel. But unfortunately the matter is not as simple as this. Even if one establishes -to take a typical and vexed example -that Bruegel's Adoration of the Magi (plate 20)^^ hung in a secular context, and had no ostensible ritual function, it is still probable that the individual beholder would have responded to it in terms of the associations which this particular religious subject was capable of arousing, irrespective of its context. We have, therefore, to consider not only the intended and recognized function of an image -its manifest function -but also its unintended and unrecognized function, which we may call latent, to borrow a distinction used in the now classical analysis of functional explanation by R.K. Merton.''° What this implies, of course, is that one cannot speak in terms of a single meaning for a particular image; most art historians will have learned that its meaning may be modified according to its immediate context, and this is perhaps too obvious to need elaboration here. But what I would hke to add is that it can also retain elements of Its meaning in other contexts. This is why apparently decorative images, as in the case of Madonnas in Flower Garlands, may still retain traces of their original religious function."
All this contributes to the difficulty of interdiction. Let us turn again to one of Pieter Aertsen's many paintings of Chnst tn the House of Martha and Mary (plate 7) of the kind which so irked Erasmus, as well as Molanus.^^ At first sight it seems nothing more than the representation of a kitchen scene, with an extensive depiction of vegetables and meat. But recent research has proved that the real mesining of the picture is to be found only when one takes the trouble to look into the background.^^ The clear implication of the scene of Christ in the House of Martha and Mary is that one is not to be diverted from faith (the 'one thing needful' m the biblical account of the scene), nor from amor dei, by sensual distraction, amor camts.^'* In addition, it has been suggested that the painting implies a recommendation of the contemplative life over the active one -Martha being the personification of the latter, and Mary (who chose the good part, the 'one thing needful' of Luke 10, 38) of the former.^^ Similarly, in one of Aertsen's most typical scenes (plate 23)'* an amorously engaged couple is set amidst a great quantity of market produce, their actions stressed by the presence of the birds whose symbolic connotations are now well known. But the moralistic point, as one comes to expect, is made by the scene in the background -predictably of Chnst and the Adulterous Woman. What kind of picture is this, we may now ask ourselves, and what would the censors have made of it? If they objected to its lascivious imagery, then the point could always have been made that it had, m fact, a moralistic intention, perfectly in accordance with Christian dogma. And if it hung m a tavern -or dining room -then it would have served that purpose even better.
Although pictures like these, with the religious subject placed well into the background of abundant kitchen and market scenes already begin to be produced in the 1550s, it is in the 1560s, m the very decade of iconoclasm, that they enjoy their greatest vogue. Could it be that these apparently secular paintings were felt to be less subject to Protestant attack, even to damage and destruction, than straightforward religious subjects?'' The ways m which accepted definitions of the borderline between sacred and profane were capable of modification provide some of the major clues to the ineffectiveness of interdiction, whether Protestant or Catholic.
Bruegel's painting of The Woman Taken in Adultery (plate 22)'* unlike Aertsen's, presents a different and more difficult kind of problem. If, as seems possible. It was intended to be read as a plea for tolerance,^^ then this kind of meaning can only be discovered by the use of the biblical story as a symbol of tolerance in other literary or visual contexts; and its meaning could not have been defined as such, as a plea for tolerance, outside a circle (of which Bruegel may have been part) to whom such Ein idea would have been important or sympathetic. Otherwise its meaning would have remained on the level of the manifest, and would certainly have been immune from charges of heterodoxy. A similar problem is raised by the great picture of the Carrying of the Cross (plate 21).*° It may be that there are Anabaptist allusions here -which seems unlikely, despite the efforts of certain scholars to discover them^' -but 20. Pieter Bruegel the Elder, The Adoration of the Magi National Gallery, London 111 X 83.5 cm. when It looked so obviously simildr to olher pictures oi the same subject at the time, such as several paintings b\ Pieter Aertsen (plate 24)*^ and the man\ paintmgs of the mysterious Brunswick Monogrammist and Hem met de Bles (plate 25)^^ then it must have been capable of having the same relatively straightforward meaning as they had.*"* Paintings like these have been discussed -perhaps too ellipticalK -because they highhght some of the mam problems of arriving at a more precise analysis of the status of images in the sixteenth century. It is clear that images may ha\e both a manifest and a latent meaning, according to their context, and to some extent a hidden, subconscious one as well. But Victor Turner has defined two further kinds of meaning which are of some relevance to a study of the kind suggested here.*^ The operational meaning of a symbol -what we ha\e called its function -is derived from the use made of the symbol, the social composition of the groups responding to it, and the affective qualities of the symbol in terms of the rituals or other social processes associated with it, while the positional meaning is constituted b\ the relationship of the svmbol to other symbols in the total social or ritual system. In any given context, as we have seen, only a few of the meanings of a polysemous svmbol may be stressed.*Ŵ hat this paper has tried to suggest are the ways m which a symbol may none the less generate associations from its use m other contexts; or, as Turner put It, that the latent and to a certain extent the hidden meanings ot a dominant symbol in one context may be discoveied by using exegetic reports on its significance in another.*' While the main aim ofthe art historian mav as well be to discover dominant meanings, it is only by taking into account the potential fluidity of meaning that he can define more precisely the status of an image, and -incidentally -account for the failure of interdiction.^Î have discussed the matter of attempted interdictions and some kinds of images produced contemporaneous!) with them in order to show how the Durkheimian distinction between sacred and profane may be capable of modification according to function and context. But this is not to say that the distinction is too blunt to be of use. Durkheim himself never held that the distinction was fixed, and he devoted some attention to the matter of the contagiousness of the sacred,*' in ways that may be exemplified by several of the images referred to m this paper and by the responses to them. In any case, his system was not intended as a means of classifying objects, but rather of explaining the polarities of social consciousness -the polarities, it should be emphasized, and not the merging elements of the spectrum I have also examined the imphcations of the fusion of image and prototvpe. both by those who were m favour of images and those who were against them, to show that although for the purpose of analysis it may be best to separate sign and signified, they are hable to amalgamate, sometimes with quite dramatic consequences, in both the psychological and the social sphere. The matter of interdiction Itself strikingly demonstrates the problem of confronting the fluiditx of the signified when it is conditioned by the status of the sign.
Pieter Bruegel the Elder
It will perhaps have been observed that the first part of the title of this paper has been used at least twice before. Apart from Hubert Schrade's study of the representation of God in Israel and the Ancient Orient -Der
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Verborgene Gott Gottesbild und Gottesvorstellung in Israel und itn Alten
Orient -which provides the basic material for some of the theological underpinnings of Western attitudes towards images,'° I refer, of course, to Lucien Goldmann's masterly description of the vision of God in the work of Pascal and Racine, entitled Le Dieu cache.^^ Although Goldmann's hidden god is an entirely different phenomenon from that described here, the approach to cultural artifacts -in the one case hterary, in the other visual -proceeds from the same conviction. 'The mode of behaviour which enables us to understand a particular work is not that of the author himself, but that of a whole social group.'^^ This claim is not a particularly novel one, and it has since been superseded by many refinements on the theme of the comparative inconsequence of authorial meaning.'^ But histonans of art have been unusually slow to attend to its nch implications, even though they have always made gestures in that direction. Works of art are not autonomous manifestations of the individual creative spirit, and to study them as if they were is to be careless of the material processes of history. Indeed, the artist's intention, the meaning which they had for him, may well not coincide with the meaning they acquire in their social context. This paper began with a discussion of lconoclasm and interdiction, and went on to discuss the problem of meaning, in order to show that it is possible for the historian to determine not only what an image was supposed to mean, or indeed, to be, but also what it actually meant to those who beheld it,** not only what the artist intended it to signify, but also what it signified in terms of the society for which it was made. Such issues are just as amenable to investigation as the more traditional forms of art historical analysis, whether lconographic, stylistic or functional, although the analytic procedures may be different. Problems of response, particularly on the part of the unlettered, have tended to be regarded as incapable of anything other than sociological analysis, but this seems to me to take rather an ungenerous view of the possibilities of historical examination. The historian of images seems better equipped than most to deal with past data'^ concerning the relations between material objects and socialized forms of perception: from the intemal relations of images themselves he may arrive at conclusions not only about their status, but also about the ways in which the) were perceived; from collective notions about what images are supposed to be and how they are supposed to work he may proceed inductively to reinforce the admittedly scattered historical evidence for effect and response --even in the absence of written testimony. There are dangers in turning from behaviour to cognition, or, indeed, in the a priori assumption of cognitive processes; but if he can tum from his traditional preoccupation with how images are made to the way they work it may no longer be necessary to justify the retreat into positivism on the grounds of the lacunae of the past. 
David Freedberg
